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1  Introduction
Hazardous chemicals, if released or misused, can pose significant threats to sur-
rounding communities.1 Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, congressional policy 
makers had expressed concern about the safety and security of US chemical faci-
lities containing hazardous chemicals, but they had not proactively implemented 
safety and security measures to safeguard these facilities.2 After the attacks, as 
awareness of future threats increased, chemical industry leaders – without any 
government intervention – began to proactively install security enhancements 
1 George D. Haddow, Jane A. Bullock, and Damon P. Coppola, Introduction to Emergency Man-
agement (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2011).
2 Dana A. Shea, Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress, CRS Report 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2012), 1, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
homesec/R41642.pdf.
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3 William E. Allmond, “Testimony,” The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program: 
Addressing Its Challenges and Finding a Way Forward (testimony before the House Committee 
on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security 
Technologies, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., March 6, 2012), 3, www.hsdl.org/?view&did=703955.
4 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, p. 1.
5 Rand Beers, “Statement for the Record,” Evaluating Internal Operation and Implementation of 
the chemical facility anti-terrorism standards program (CFATS) by the Department of Homeland 
Security (testimony before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on 
Environment and the Economy, 112th Cong., 2nd session, February 3, 2012), p.  2, energycom-
merce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Hearings/EE/20120203/
HHRG-112-IF18-WState-RBeers-20120203.pdf; Shea, Chemical Facility Security, p. 4.
6 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, p. 1.
7 Ibid.
at their facilities.3 Congress, having also become more aware of the possibility 
of chemical terrorist attacks, passed legislation in 2006 giving the department 
of homeland security (DHS) the mandate to regulate chemical facilities through 
the chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS)4 in order to increase secu-
rity at chemical facilities. DHS gave the responsibility for overseeing CFATS to 
the infrastructure security compliance division (ISCD).5 ISCD is under the Office 
of infrastructure protection (IP), which itself is under DHS’s national protection 
and program directorate (NPPD). Since 2006, Congress has extended the statu-
tory authority of CFATS on an ad hoc basis. CFATS will expire on March 27, 2013, 
although President Obama has requested that Congress extend it until October 4, 
2013.6 Different stakeholders – the chemical industry, DHS, advocacy groups, and 
policy makers – have also called for a reauthorization of CFATS.7
While the requested extension of CFATS is pending, it is reasonable to 
examine how the law and its implementing regulations have been operating thus 
far. This is especially important for at least six distinct reasons: (1) Does CFATS, 
as implemented, actually reflect the will of Congress? (2) Does CFATS, as imple-
mented, actually ramp up security for the chemical industry? (3) Is the risk-based 
system used for CFATS vulnerability assessments a rational fit within the CFATS 
regulatory scheme? (4) Has CFATS, since its implementation, provided a bal-
anced set of benefits to both the US government and the chemical industry? (5) 
What are the best arguments for and against an extension of CFATS? (6) Is CFATS, 
as implemented, leading to unintended consequences?
These six initial questions are very important for emergency management and 
homeland security purposes because the US chemical industry has to address the 
fact that major chemical facilities, which process, store, or produce highly toxic 
chemicals, can put their surrounding neighborhoods and employees into lethal 
jeopardy that may exceed the capabilities of local first responders to control. In 
addition, those chemical facilities highest in value and vulnerability are a major 
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critical infrastructure of the US and thus may require an enhanced level of both 
passive and active defenses.
To better assess CFATS after 5 years, this paper addresses those six questions 
in brief and presents an overview of the CFATS process and of how we arrived 
at this juncture in the extension of CFATS regulations. It then discusses CFATS 
issues and concerns with respect to the chemical industry, Congress, DHS, and 
public safety. Next, it reviews the major achievements, challenges, and the risks 
ahead. Finally, it speculates on the future of CFATS.
2  Brief Overview of the CFATS Process
According to an interim final rule issued by DHS on April 9, 2007, the secretary 
of DHS identified 322 “chemicals of interest” (COI).8 Chemical facilities are cat-
egorized according to the screening threshold of each chemical of interest they 
possess.9 DHS characterizes the potential risks that these COI can pose on the 
basis of three contexts: release, theft or diversion, and sabotage and contami-
nation.10 It is important to note that DHS has issued interim CFATS regulations, 
which, apart from what the law calls for, have since 2007 provided the governing 
umbrella for the US chemical industry on key issues such as COI. It remains to 
be seen whether CFATS will be extended as an interim regulation, or whether 
changes in the language of the law will be made.
A chemical facility that contains any of the COI at the threshold quantities 
established by DHS has to submit a consequence-based screening tool, “Top-
Screen,” to DHS, after which a preliminary risk tier will be assigned to the facility.11 
DHS can assign a risk tier of 1–4, where tier 1 is designated for chemical facilities 
with the highest risk level.12 Once a risk tier is assigned, a facility has 90 days 
to submit a security vulnerability assessment (SVA). Thereafter DHS reviews the 
8 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, p. 2.
9 Ibid.; Beers, “Statement for the Record, ” p. 3; Government Accountability Office, Critical In-
frastructure Protection: DHS Is Taking Action to Better Manage Its Chemical Security Program, 
but It Is Too Early to Assess Results,GAO-12-515T, Testimony before the House Committee on Ap-
propriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security (statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, director, 
Homeland Security and Justice, July 26, 2012), www.gao.gov/assets/600/593020.pdf.
10 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, p. 2.
11 Suzanne Spaulding, “Statement for the Record,” Department Of Homeland Security – chemical 
facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS) Program (testimony before the House Committee on Ap-
propriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, 112th Congress, 2nd Session, July 26, 2012), 
p. 3, www.hsdl.org/?view&did=719047.
12 Beers, “Statement for the Record,” 3.
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SVA and assigns a final tier level. The facility then has 120 days in which to submit 
a site security plan (SSP) or an alternate security plan (ASP), and it can use the 
Chemical Security Assessment Tool developed by ISCD to conduct and develop 
its plan.13 Once the SSP/ASP is submitted, DHS reviews it, inspects the facility, 
and either approves the plan or disapproves it. If the plan is approved, the facility 
can implement it and is considered CFATS compliant.14 If the plan is disapproved, 
the facility has to address the deficiencies identified during the inspection and 
resubmit the SSP/ASP (see Figure 1).
3  Six Key Questions
For various reasons, the aforementioned six questions have immediate implica-
tions for emergency management and homeland security. Briefly examining the 
answers to these questions while also reviewing other issues, this paper provides 
a better picture of what lies ahead as the public policy dimensions of a CFATS 
extension loom. There are many legitimate questions that could be raised to 
assess those dimensions of CFATS and of its impending extension, but a few fun-
damental issues should be confronted first.
The first thorny issue to be tackled involves the degree to which CFATS, as 
implemented thus far, actually reflects the will of Congress. Diverse opinions will 
emerge on this question, and interest groups of all stripes concerned about the 
extension of CFATS will weigh in before a formal extension decision is made. DHS 
will likely argue that its regulations parallel congressional intent, but will the 
chemical industry agree? Will public interest watchdog groups agree?
Second, who is in the best position to assess the degree to which CFATS, as 
implemented, has actually ramped up chemical facility security? The chemi-
cal industry itself? DHS and chemical experts? Academics, chemical industry 
leaders, and DHS in unison? Although this issue is crucial and as yet undefined, 
it appears that DHS, some chemical industry representatives, and some congres-
sional members think that CFATS is making the industry safer.15 If this is true, the 
next question is, how broad is that consensus among these key interest groups?
Third, is the risk-based system for CFATS, which relies on a uniform defi-
nition of COI, chemical-terrorism vulnerability information (CVI), or an SSP, a 
rational fit within the CFATS regulatory scheme? One haunting scenario holds 
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Allmond, “Testimony”; Beers, “Statement for the Record”; and Shea, Chemical Facility 
 Security.
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that there is an irreconcilable difference between these regulatory metrics, which 
turn principally on the myriad risk-management systems, and the solutions one 
could select that would arguably be most effective from both an industry and a 
homeland security standpoint. The degree to which certain risk-based systems 
are challenged or favored over others endorsed by DHS or the chemical industry 
or public interest groups is very uncertain.
A fourth issue entails the controversial matter of whether the existing interim 
regulations, whether continued or modified, actually balance real benefits for 
both the US government and the chemical industry. If the balance is tilted to favor 
one party over the other, is this good public policy? Balancing public safety and 
security interests against enterprise interests is always a dicey proposition, and 
it brings with it a host of unanswered questions about the inherent trade-offs 
involved. Questions about how the balance is to be achieved and how it will be 
structured are ambiguous at best.
A fifth issue is that only by looking back at the totality of CFATS interim regu-
lations as implemented can one make an honest and objective assessment as to 
whether a CFATS extension is warranted. Certainly, political, economic, systems 
operations, and security questions must be factored into any such decision, but 
should we expect to see a rigorously neutral approach without extraneous and 
non-meritorious influences? What objective and rational criteria will guide the 
decision about CFATS continuation as is?
Finally, it is important to know whether CFATS is leading to unintended 
consequences, such as inadvertent compromises in public safety, reductions in 
chemical production, or chemical facilities relocating some or all of their pro-
cesses overseas or going out of business altogether. If the answer is yes, a major 
implication would be a reduction in the number of chemical industry-related jobs 
available in the US.
4  CFATS Issues and Concerns
As we move through the assessment of CFATS, some key issues and concerns 
to four CFATS stakeholders – the chemical industry, Congress, DHS, and the 
public – should be considered. This is not an exhaustive list, but it illustrates the 
comple xity of the undertaking. The issues discussed under each CFATS stake-
holder below are those that are directly relevant to that stakeholder and may be 
indirectly rele vant to other stakeholders. However, some issues that are directly 
relevant to multiple stakeholders are discussed under one stakeholder. For 
example, insufficient funding is both a congressional and DHS issue.
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4.1  The Chemical Industry
4.1.1  Long-term Extension of CFATS
Although the chemical industry has invested billions of dollars in security mea-
sures,16 many chemical facilities are reluctant to invest more in security measures 
because CFATS has not been permanently authorized. The industry is in limbo 
on what security measures to put in place in case the CFATS program is not given 
permanent authorization or goes away all together. According to a recent study by 
the American chemistry council (ACC), the industry thinks an extension of CFATS 
will improve security at chemical facilities.17 Although DHS has shown support 
for the permanent authorization of CFATS,18 there is no indication that Congress 
will approve such an authorization. The implication of a lack of long-term exten-
sion can be summed up by the statement of Matthew Leary, the corporate envi-
ronmental health and safety manager for Pilot Chemical Company during his 
testimony before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce’s Subcommit-
tee on Environment and the Economy: “we cannot spend dollars on security in 
advance unless we are clear that what is spent will directly lead to compliance 
with the [CFATS] standard.”19
4.1.2  Transparency of CFATS
One issue of transparency is that tier assignment is a black box to the chemical 
industry. No one in the industry seems to understand how facilities are assigned 
tiers – perhaps because the information on which tier assignments are based, 
including but not limited to information about chemical facility vulnerabilities, 
is not divulged to the public and is in fact protected by law.20 This may sound 
like a good idea in that sensitive information will not get into the hands of ter-
rorists, but there are concerns about inability of local emergency management 
officials and first responders to access CVI.21 For instance, if there is a fire at a 
16 Allmond, “Testimony.”
17 Beers, “Statement for the Record,” p. 9.
18 Ibid.
19 Matthew J. Leary, “Testimony,” The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program – A 
Progress Report (testimony before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommit-
tee on Environment and the Economy, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., September 11, 2012), p. 5, www.
hsdl.org/?view&did=722420.
20 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, pp. 16–17.
21 Ibid.
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chemical facility, firefighters must know what type of chemicals they are dealing 
with before they can try to put out the fire. This lack of transparency could cause 
covered facilities to mistrust the CFATS program and could lead to an increase 
in noncompliance.
There is also the central question of what compliance actually means. Is com-
pliance uniformly applied to all tier 1 facilities, or does it vary with inspection 
regimes or contain internal variations among facilities to allow for distinctions 
between different plants and their production environments and chemical pro-
cesses? Is there such a thing as “marginal compliance” or “marginal noncom-
pliance,” and what recourse does the chemical industry or DHS have to resolve 
technically ambiguous situations?
4.2  Congress
4.2.1   Whether to Apply CFATS to Water and Wastewater Treatment Facilities
Under the current provision, water and wastewater treatment facilities are exempt 
from CFATS. Because the federal government does not regulate these facilities – 
although the owners can voluntarily engage in chemical security measures  – 
some advocacy groups, DHS, and the environmental protection agency (EPA) 
have called for the regulation of water and wastewater treatment facilities.22 The 
argument is that these facilities also have some COI that could harm communities 
if they fall into the wrong hands. Others have argued against this move, citing an 
adverse impact on the public (e.g., water may not be available to residents if the 
federal government shuts down the community’s only water facility as a result 
of noncompliance) as a reason not to regulate water and wastewater treatment 
facilities.23
4.2.2   Whether CFATS Should Mandate the Chemical Industry to Incorporate 
Inherently Safer Technology
Another lingering controversial issue is whether CFATS should mandate the 
chemical industry to incorporate inherently safer technologies (IST). Some 
chemical safety experts believe that the requirement of IST might make chemical 
22 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, p. 18.
23 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, pp. 18–19.
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industries ship their operations overseas24 and that ISCD does not have the exper-
tise to understand and implement IST.25
Still, we cannot judge the influential perspectives of the parties most pas-
sionate about CFATS extension unless we include the perspective of DHS.
4.3  Department of Homeland Security
4.3.1  Personnel Surety
A very important problem for ISCD is how to resolve the personnel surety require-
ment of CFATS. Risk-based performance standard (RBPS) #12 “requires covered 
chemical facilities to verify and validate identity, check criminal history, verify 
and validate legal authorization to work, and identify individuals with terrorist 
ties.”26 Although this RBPS makes sense, the chemical industry cannot implement 
the last requirement without the help of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,27 
which is in charge of the Terrorist Screening Database. As a way forward, the 
society of chemical manufacturers and affiliates (SOCMA) has recommended that 
DHS leverage the use of existing federal credentials that already screen workers, 
such as the Transportation Worker Identification Credential.28 In so doing, ISCD 
would avoid duplication of effort.29
4.3.2  Turnover in ISCD Management
In the last few years, there have been several turnovers in ISCD leadership. The 
high turnover rate will slow down the progress of CFATS; this is because it takes 
time for new leadership to understand CFATS and build trust with the various 
stakeholders, including staff and the industry. In addition, continuous changes 
in leadership might send the wrong signal to stakeholders about the stability and 
consistency of CFATS regulation. As a result, the chemical industry may be reluc-
tant to make additional investments in chemical security.
24 Leary, “Testimony.”
25 Allmond, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program, p. 8.
26 Department of Homeland Security [DHS] Appropriations Bill, 2013, H.R. 112-492, 112th Con-
gress, 2nd session (2012), 103, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112hrpt492/pdf/CRPT-112hrpt492.pdf.
27 Leary, “Testimony.”
28 Allmond, “Testimony,” p. 7.
29 DHS Appropriations Bill, 2013.
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4.3.3  CFATS Inspection Rate
Although the rate of inspections of chemical facilities is slow, two facilities have 
completed the CFATS process, and DHS has carried out nineteen authorization 
inspections as of September 2012.30 DHS anticipates that it will take about an 
additional 7 years to approve and complete the inspections for all covered facili-
ties,31 despite the establishment of an Inspector Tools Working Group, which is 
supposed to help speed up inspections.32 The inspection regime itself, its tech-
nical integrity, and its uniformity of approach among facilities are as subject 
to internal and external scrutiny as any other aspect of CFATS. Would the DHS 
inspector general reserve the option of reviewing completed inspections to render 
an opinion on their operation?
Finally, we must be able to assess what some of the major public safety issues 
and concerns about a CFATS extension might be. Here is one worth noting.
4.4   A Public Safety Concern: Use of Contractors to Perform 
Government Work
One of the challenges mentioned in a November 2011 internal memo is the use of 
outside contractors to do government work.33 This practice can create a loophole 
in the chemical security system that could be exploited by terrorists: terrorists 
could conceivably set up a phony contracting business and bid for government 
contracts in order to gain access to sensitive information or restricted areas. 
Should this occur, they may be able to pose a significant threat to public safety. 
Aside from the potential threat to security, the use of contractors can be costly, 
lead to high turnover, constant training of new contractors, and loss of institu-
tional knowledge.34
5  Achievements of CFATS
This section examines the achievements of CFATS during its short time in 
existence.
30 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, p. 13.
31 Ibid., pp. 13–14.
32 Spaulding, “Statement for the Record.”
33 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, p. 10.
34 Allmond, “Testimony,” p. 9.
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5.1  Improved Safety of the Chemical Industry
DHS officials believe that CFATS is making the chemical industry safer against 
potential terrorist attacks,35 and they not alone in this respect. Rep. John Shimkus, 
chairman of the Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy and SOCMA, 
also believes that CFATS is enhancing chemical security.36 In addition, a recent 
ACC study found that the chemical industry has made substantial investment in 
security measures since the passage of CFATS.37 Furthermore, since the start of 
CFATS, the total number of chemical facilities assigned to a risk tier has declined.38 
According to NPPD deputy undersecretary Suzanne Spaulding, since CFATS was 
implemented, more than 1800 chemical facilities have completely removed their 
COI and more than 900 others have reduced their COI holdings and are no longer 
considered high risk.39 While there are many factors that may have contributed 
to this decline – for example, erroneous filings, process changes, and business 
operation decisions – DHS claims that CFATS is improving industry safety by 
inducing voluntary reductions in COI.40 In sum, it does appear that there is tripar-
tite agreement among Congress, DHS, and the chemical industry that CFATS is 
making the chemical industry safer against potential terrorist attacks.
5.2  Collaborations with Industry
Although the level of collaboration between DHS and the chemical industry is not 
as high as the industry or Congress would like, it is fair to give credit to DHS for 
collaborating with the industry on some issues. A good example of this collabo-
ration is the use of an alternate security plan (ASP) that was developed by ACC. 
DHS allows chemical facilities to use an ASP in lieu of an SSP, and the chemical 
industry seems happy to explore the use of an ASP.41 Although ACC plans to pilot 
the ASP template soon, it appears that the flexibility the ASP will give to chemi-
cal facilities will help to improve CFATS and increase chemical industry support 
for it.
DHS is also looking to collaborate with the chemical industry on other 
industry-led initiatives, such as SOCMA’s ChemStewards® and ACC’s Responsible 
35 Beers, “Statement for the Record,” p. 5.
36 Allmond, “Testimony”; Shea, Chemical Facility Security.
37 Beers, “Statement for the Record,” p. 9.
38 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, p. 7.
39 Spaulding, “Statement for the Record,” p. 1.
40 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, p. 7.
41 Spaulding, “Statement for the Record.”
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Care®.42 However, it is fair to question whether the extent of collaboration on the 
overall extension of CFATS is sufficient to enable its continuation without major 
changes.
5.3  Training of CFATS Inspectors
When Congress mandated DHS to implement CFATS in 2006, the department had 
no chemical facility security office or inspectors.43 However, since then, DHS has 
established an office of chemical facility security and has increased the number 
of inspectors. Further, it has implemented a Basic Inspector School training 
program.44 By February 2012, DHS had filled all fourteen available leadership 
positions and hired 102 inspectors out of 108 available positions.45 These invest-
ments in personnel will go a long way toward making CFATS a better program.
6  Challenges Facing CFATS
We now examine some of the challenges facing CFATS, which are likely to influ-
ence the congressional decision on whether to extend the interim CFATS regula-
tions. We also look at the cascading effects that these challenges may have on 
both the chemical industry and government.
6.1  Little Progress
One thing on which many stakeholders concur is that DHS has made a modicum 
of progress in implementing CFATS. The DHS Appropriations Bill, 2013 states 
that “in spite of ample appropriations provided by Congress, the Department 
has made little progress carrying out its regulatory responsibilities for … the 
chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS) program.”46 A report that 
came out of the internal review of ISCD and submitted to Undersecretary Beers 
in November 2011 notes that one of the challenges facing CFATS is ISCD’s inabi-
lity to review SSPs in a consistent and timely manner.47 In fact, at the time of 
42 Ibid., p. 6.
43 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, p. 4.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 DHS Appropriations Bill, 2013, p. 101.
47 Beers, “Statement for the Record.”
Brought to you by | IUPUI - Indiana University / Purdue University Indianapolis
Authenticated | 134.68.173.183
Download Date | 8/7/13 8:08 PM
CFATS: Achievements, Challenges, and Risks Ahead      13
this report, 4200 SSPs submitted to DHS by chemical facilities had not been 
approved.48 This same report enumerates several reasons for the lack of pro-
gress: inability of DHS to conduct compliance inspections, lack of adequate 
record keeping, human resource issues, and the use of contractors to do gov-
ernment work, to mention a few.49 Two additional factors contributing to slow 
implementation of CFATS are inadequate funding and the lag between training 
of inspectors and their deployment into the field.50 According to Allmond, the 
slow implementation of CFATS can lead to (1) uncertainty and, consequently, 
unwillingness of the chemical industry to invest in more security measures; (2) 
negative stories in the press, which would not augur well for DHS and CFATS; 
and (3) the chemical industry’s belief that the federal government is not serious 
about chemical security.51
6.2  Insufficient Funding for CFATS
To implement CFATS, DHS needs adequate funding to hire and train staff and 
inspectors. Funds are also needed for providing the necessary tools such as 
vehicles for inspectors to carry out their jobs. Congress is unsure whether the 
funding given to DHS for CFATS implementation is adequate and whether prior 
funds were used appropriately.52 The answer to the former question is that more 
funding is needed to implement CFATS if the president’s budget for fiscal year 
2013 is anything to go by. According to this budget, the president has requested 
$74.544 million for the ISC program, and part of this appropriation will be used 
to hire 253 full-time positions.53 With regard to the latter question, the ISCD 
internal report revealed that funds were squandered in the past (e.g., by hiring 
workers with insufficient skills and not keeping proper records of consumables 
used).54
48 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, p. 10.
49 Ibid.
50 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, p. 10.
51 Allmond, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program, p. 6.
52 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, p. 12.
53 Rand Beers and David Wulf, “Statement for the Record,” The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 
Standards Program – A Progress Report (testimony before the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy, 112th Congress, 2nd session, Sep-
tember 11, 2012), 7, www.hsdl.org/?view&did=722420; Spaulding, “Statement for the Record,” p. 7.
54 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, pp. 10–11.
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6.3  Organizational Culture and Employee Morale
Another challenge identified by the report on ISCD internal review has to do with 
the organizational culture and the employee morale.55 The frequent change in ISCD 
leadership since the inception of CFATS has led to poor organizational structure and 
a lack of morale among ISCD employees. In addition, some ISCD employees had 
particular skills that did not fit well with what they were hired to do.56 For example, 
some inspectors only had prior law enforcement training.57 While law enforcement 
training is good for CFATS inspectors, knowledge of chemical processes is equally 
important. This shows that some employees simply did not have the necessary 
quali fications or training to get the job done. All these problems may lead to reduced 
productivity, low employee morale, and high turnover among ISCD employees.
6.4   A Lack of Support from the Office of Infrastructure  Protection 
and the National Program and Protection Directorate
According to the report on ISCD internal review, the Office of infrastructure protec-
tion (IP) and the national program and protection directorate (NPPD) did not give 
the necessary support to ISCD to manage CFATS in the early days of the program. 
A lack of support from upper-level management has been shown to be a negative 
factor in adopting risk-reducing measures;58 it can also slow down the implemen-
tation of programs. In the case of CFATS, both IP and NPPD have to approve the 
CFATS provisions suggested by ISCD, give backing to the provisions, and provide 
funding to implement them. Without the full support of these two important 
bodies, it is practically impossible for the CFATS program to make headway.
6.5  Anomaly in a DHS Risk-Assessment Tool
An anomaly that was first discovered in one of the risk-assessment tools that DHS 
used to assign tiers to facilities was thought to have been resolved in May 2010.59 It 
55 Beers, “Statement for the Record.”
56 Ibid.
57 Mike Levine, “EXCLUSIVE: Beset by Strife at Chemical Security Office, DHS Internal Report 
Claims Anti-Terrorism Program Now in Jeopardy,” Foxnews, December 21, 2011, www.foxnews.
com/politics/2011/12/21/exclusive-beset-by-strife-at-dhs-office-future-anti-terrorism-program-
now-in/ (accessed February 23, 2013).
58 Abdul-Akeem Sadiq and Christopher Weible, “Obstacles and Disaster Risk Reduction: Survey 
of Memphis Organizations,” Natural Hazards Review 11, no. 3 (2010), pp. 110–117.
59 Shea, Chemical Facility Security, p. 6.
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was only in June 2011, when a new acting ISCD director came into office, that this 
anomaly was “rediscovered” and rectified, resulting in the reassignment of about 
500 facilities to a lower-risk tier.60 This anomaly in DHS’s risk-assessment tool can 
lead the chemical industry to mistrust the risk tier process and, as a result, can 
jeopardize the progress of the CFATS program.
7  The Future of CFATS
Best- versus worst-case scenarios are often hard to identify when so many inter-
vening variables are involved. In a grossly analytical manner, it is possible to 
briefly outline a series of possibilities with regard to the future of CFATS interim 
federal regulations (IFR): (1) they are extended without changes; (2) they are 
extended with minor changes; (3) they are extended but with major changes/ 
enhancements; or (4) they are not extended. The future of the IFR is not easy 
to predict. Questions about who benefits and who is disadvantaged get lost 
somehow in the traditional tug-of-war between what is good public policy as 
an independent outcome per se versus whatever is good for the industry versus 
DHS. On the one hand, if the industry feels that the IFR have been oppressive and 
curtail efficient operations, political and economic pressures may call for their 
nullification or major modification. On the other hand, if the IFR are deemed to 
be “in the public interest” by solidifying DHS leadership in this domain through 
extension or strengthening of the regulations, another outcome is likely.
8  Risks that Will Not Go Away
It is possible that the list of covered facilities will grow in the future as more 
facilities engage in chemical processes involving one or more COI, or as currently 
covered facilities become riskier or climb up in the risk-tier ladder. The current 
number of covered facilities and the potential for that number to increase could 
heighten our vulnerability to potential chemical terrorist attacks in the future, 
which would present an even more daunting homeland security and emer-
gency management problem. For instance, toxic clouds of lethal chemicals 
could present a threat so widespread and persistent that no assembly of local 
firefighters augmented by military units could suppress the ensuing death and 
destruction.
60 Ibid.
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9  Conclusion
A major realization after the 9/11 terrorist attacks was, and continues to be, that 
our chemical facilities and infrastructure could be targeted by terrorists. As a 
result, Congress gave DHS the mandate to regulate chemical facilities. DHS’s 
implementation of CFATS 5 years ago has very important implications for home-
land security and emergency management. Hence, it is necessary to assess CFATS 
since its implementation by focusing on its achievements, its challenges, and the 
risks that the chemical industry poses to circumjacent communities. This paper 
has discussed several issues that are relevant to four key CFATS stakeholders: the 
chemical industry, Congress, DHS, and the public. These issues include trans-
parency of CFATS, whether to apply CFATS to water and wastewater treatment 
facilities, the inspection rate of CFATS, and the use of contractors to perform 
 government work, respectively.
It is important to note that since the implementation of CFATS, this burgeon-
ing program has made some notable achievements, such as making the chemical 
industry safer. However, CFATS has some challenges as well, such as insufficient 
funding. These achievements and challenges will have a tremendous impact on 
Congress’s decision on whether to continue or discontinue the program. While it 
is unclear what Congress will do, what is clear is that presumptive measures for 
ensure physical security and protection from sabotage, insider threats, theft and 
diversion, and toxic releases by terrorists cannot be established to handle all pos-
sible crisis scenarios, whether those scenarios are triggered by a terrorist attack 
or a major earthquake. A collaborative partnership must exist, which brings the 
chemical industry, DHS, the military, health officials, local emergency manag-
ers, and the public together to assess – using tabletop and formal exercises – the 
extent to which risks can be mitigated or controlled. Without such collabora-
tion, it will be very difficult to establish presumptive measures to thwart terrorist 
attacks against chemical facilities.
The issues we have raised here are not exhaustive, but they should serve 
as a starting place for researchers interested in exploring CFATS and down-
stream chemical security-related issues. The chemical industry is part of our 
nation’s critical infrastructure, and its products are essential to our economy 
and national defense. Hence, its ability to move forward in chemical produc-
tion and innovation while balancing public safety and security is crucial. 
We therefore call for further research in this area with the hope of improving 
chemical security and preventing future terrorist attacks against our critical 
infrastructure.
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